Optimal Utilitarian Taxation and Horizontal Equity by Jordahl, Henrik & Luca Micheletto
Optimal Utilitarian Taxation
and Horizontal Equity∗
Henrik Jordahl￿(YE) (presenter) and Luca Micheletto￿
Uppsala University and L. Bocconi University, Milan
January 18, 2002
Abstract
We impose a horizontal equity constraint on the problem of ￿nd-
ing the optimal utilitarian tax mix. The horizontal equity constraint
requires that individuals with the same ability have to pay the same
amount of taxes regardless of their preferences for leisure. Contrary to
normal ￿ndings, we ￿nd that a good that is complementary to leisure
need not be discouraged by the tax system, and that a good that nor-
mally should be discouraged by the tax system need not be taxed at a
positive rate even if the economy is composed of only two private com-
modities plus leisure. Similarly, the marginal eﬀective tax rate need
not be equal to zero at the top when the tax mix obeys the horizontal
equity constraint.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
A well-known problem with income taxes is that they punish hard-working
people. Nozick (1974), for example, asks why somebody who prefers looking
at a sunset should get away with paying less taxes than somebody who has
to earn money in order to attain his pleasures. This question is not only
important on its own normative ground, but also because tax systems that
blatantly violate general conceptions of equity risk being replaced if enough
citizens call them into question.
As a matter of fact, such questions of equity have to a large extent
been neglected in the optimal taxation literature, where one of the stan-
dard assumptions is that all individuals have the same preferences1.A tt h e
same time, a strand of the social choice literature has begun to study redis-
tributive schemes where individuals must bear the consequences of certain
inequalities.2 In particular, it is often advocated that an individual ought
to bear the consequences of the characteristics which he has chosen himself.
This line of reasoning is especially relevant for optimal income taxation if
the utility of leisure is heterogeneous across individuals. In that case, the
government may not want to compensate people for income diﬀerences that
are due to diﬀerences in tastes. However, since it is generally assumed that
the government can only observe an individual￿s income￿neither his ability
nor his supply of labour￿it is impossible to ￿nd an income tax scheme that
only compensates for diﬀerences in abilities. Indeed, in the public debate it
is frequently pointed out that transfers to hard-working low-skilled persons
are also bene￿ting more highly skilled but also more epicurean individuals,
since the identity of individuals from these two types can hardly be distin-
guished by their (similar) pre-tax incomes. In this paper we investigate if
and how the government can use linear commodity taxes in addition to non-
linear income taxation in order to escape this dilemma. Thus we consider
the tax instruments typically observed in developed economies.
Related to the principle of responsibility for certain inequalities is the
horizontal equity principle of equal treatment of equals. Indeed, an inter-
pretation of the horizontal equity principle is that if two individuals diﬀer
1Possible exceptions are provided by Cuﬀ (2000) and Boadway et al. (2002) for the
￿nite case, while Tarkiainen and Tuomala (1999) develop a computational approach to
tackle the problem of two-dimensional population in the continuum case. All the quoted
authors neglect the problem of the optimal structure of commodity taxation and work with
models where leisure is additive separable from other consumption goods. Sandmo (1993)
examines the utilitarian case for a linear income tax under the assumption that diﬀerences
in earnings are explained by diﬀerences in preferences over work and consumption; he also
has a brief section in which both market abilities and preferences for leisure are allowed
to vary. Ebert (1988) provides conditions on the preference orderings and the utility
functions which allow to transform the problem of optimal (utilitarian) income taxation
for a two-dimensional population into a one-dimensional problem.
2See e.g. Fleurbaey and Maniquet (1999).
2only in tastes, then the government ought to treat them identically. The
literature contains several suggestions of the status and de￿nition of hori-
zontal equity3. Musgrave (1959) argues that in the ability-to-pay approach
to taxation, ￿horizontal and vertical equity are but diﬀerent sides of the
same coin.￿ However, there are several reasons for taxing people with the
same ability diﬀerently. Besides the con￿icts arising from the government￿s
lack of information, Stiglitz (1982) demonstrates that the horizontal equity
requirement does not follow from the maximization of a traditional utilitar-
ian or more general social welfare function (which does not consider relations
between individual outcomes), and, more strongly, that it may also be incon-
sistent with Pareto optimality. In a recent contribution, Kaplow and Shavell
(2001b) prove formally that any non-welfarist method of policy assessment4,
such as the ones involved in the concern for horizontal equity, violates the
Pareto principle.
In view of this expected con￿ict between horizontal and vertical equity,
it is often argued that the former should take precedence over the latter.
In line with this, Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976, 1980) suggest the imposition
of a horizontal equity constraint on the maximization of a social welfare
function5. Feldstein (1976) instead suggests to balance the ful￿lment of
horizontal equity against the utilitarian principle of welfare maximization.
Regarding the de￿nition of horizontal equity, the proposed measures are as
a rule either based on tax payments or on utilities. Still Johnson and Mayer
(1962) emphasize the number of inequities, though this measure could be
weighted by the corresponding diﬀerences in tax payments. Atkinson and
Stiglitz (1976, 1980) refer to Pigou, who observed that persons with diﬀerent
tastes who pay the same amount of taxes will not necessarily suﬀer equal
burdens in terms of foregone utility. Thus they argue that commodity taxes
3The relevance of this concept has recently been questioned in a series of articles by
Kaplow (1989, 1995, 2000) and Kaplow and Shavell (2000, 2001a), where it is claimed
that usually provided indices of deviations from horizontal equity are developed without
knowing what they should try to measure and why, but merely stipulated or supported
by ad hoc appeals to intuition. Moreover, Kaplow refers to and seems to share Westen￿s
(1982) view, according to which ￿Equality will cease to mistify￿and cease to skew moral
and political discourse￿when people come to realize that it is an empty form having
no substantive content of its own. (...) The endurance of the principle of equality￿
that likes should be treated alike￿is due to the fact that it is empty of content. For
the principle to have meaning, it must incorporate some external values, but once these
external values are found, the principle of equality is super￿uous.￿ According to these
authors, to pay attention to the unequal treatment of equals can be useful at most from
a practical perspective. Even though the measures oﬀered by horizontal equity indices
are not of independent normative signi￿cance, in order to alert about circumstances in
which something is amiss and social welfare, as the notion is conventionally understood,
is reduced.
4The term ￿non-welfarist￿ refers to any conception of social welfare that gives weight
to factors other than the satisfaction of the individuals￿ preferences.
5Actually, as recognized by Kaplow (1989), this approach helps avoiding at least some
of the objections related to the concept of horizontal equity.
3should be set to maintain the parity of utilities for persons who, accord-
ing to the government￿s value judgments, attained equal utility before the
imposition of taxes. Feldstein (1976) on his part proposes measures based
on actual utilities as experienced by the individuals. His measures include
the after-tax variance of utilities for people who attained equal utilities be-
fore taxes were levied. Plotnick (1981) compares ￿preordered￿ and standard
Lorenz curves and derives an index which is sensitive to the magnitude of
the changes in income rankings produced by redistribution. Auerbach and
Hassett (1999) propose a new income-based measure, suitable for applied
work. Their idea is to incorporate horizontal equity in a social welfare func-
tion by weighting each inequity between two groups by the distance (e.g. in
before-tax income) between these groups in a way that has been used in the
econometric literature on kernel density functions. Other articulations of
the concept of horizontal equity include Rosen (1978), King (1983), Berliant
and Strauss (1985), and Balcer and Sadka (1986).
In this paper we stay close in spirit to the interpretation of the con-
cept given by Bossert (1995) in terms of ￿equal transfers for equal circum-
stances￿6,a n dr e q u i r et h a ta g e n t sb e l o n g i n gt ot h es a m ea b i l i t yt y p em u s t
pay the same amount of taxes irrespective of their preferences. This can be
justi￿ed on the basis of the observation that people belonging to the same
ability type share the same opportunity set, and while diﬀerences in this
set can in some moral sense be deemed ￿irrelevant￿ and therefore call for
compensation, diﬀerences in preferences may be regarded as morally ￿rele-
vant￿, suggesting that compensation is ruled out for such diﬀerences. The
consequence of this reasoning is that individuals are fully responsible for the
structure of their preferences.
Our approach is to introduce the principle of equal transfers for equal
circumstances as a constraint on the maximization of a utilitarian social
welfare function. Although we have to admit that the choice of a tax-based
rather than a utility-based measure is to some extent arbitrary, it is simple
and also suﬃcient for focusing on the moral diﬃculties raised by the fact
that the government can only observe income diﬀerences and not diﬀerences
in abilities or preferences.
We ￿nd that the imposition of the horizontal equity requirement modi￿es
the rule for optimal commodity taxes. Contrary to normal ￿ndings a good
that is complementary to leisure need not necessarily be discouraged by the
tax system, and perhaps more peculiar, a good that should be discouraged
by the tax system in the absence of the horizontal equity condition need
not necessarily be taxed at a positive rate once this condition is imposed,
even if the economy is composed by only two private commodities plus
6This terminology comes from the division of the sources of individual outcomes into
wills, resources and circumstances. According to this division, the individual is responsible
for his wills, whereas the circumstances are factors outside his control. Diﬀerences in
circumstances can be compensated by reallocating the resources.
4leisure7. In essence, the trade-oﬀ between the eﬀects on revenue from the
commodity tax and the desire to encourage individuals to reveal their true
characteristics (i.e. abstain from mimicking) is amended by the requirement
to uphold horizontal equity. When this requirement is taken into account,
the popular prescription to loosen the incentive compatibility constraint by
taxing goods that are complementary to leisure more heavily, is only one
part of the story. We also derive eﬀective marginal tax rates for individuals
with diﬀerent characteristics and compare them with the tax rates derived
in ordinary optimal taxation models. Also in this case we ￿nd that ordinary
prescriptions have to be amended in order to satisfy the horizontal equity
principle; particularly interesting, the popular ￿no distortion at the top (of
the skill distribution)￿ result can be violated.
2 The Model
In our model economy there are three goods (two private consumption goods
c and z plus leisure), and three types of agents. Agents are characterized
by their skill or ability (wH or wL)( r e ￿ected, by assumption of perfect
competition, in the unitary wage rate they are paid) and by their taste for
leisure (αH or αL), where superscript H (L) denotes a high (low) ability or
taste for leisure. There are π1 low skilled, low taste for leisure agents (type
1w i t hwL and αL), π2 high skilled, high taste for leisure agents (type 2 with
wH and αH), and π3 high skilled, low taste for leisure agents (type 3 with





where αi is the particular preference parameter of an individual of type i
and l is the supply of labour.
Production is linear and uses labour as the only input; units are chosen
to make all producer prices equal to one, good z is chosen as numØraire
and is set untaxed, so that consumer prices are represented by the vector
(1 + t,1) = (q,1).I na d d i t i o nt ot h ec o m m o d i t yt a x ,t, the agents also have
to pay a non-linear tax T (Y ) on income Y .T h u sd i s p o s a b l ei n c o m eB equals
Y −T (Y ) and the total tax liability amounts to τ (Y )=T (Y )+tc.B yu s i n g
the relation Y






the super index on the indirect utility function is for notational convenience




note the ratio of the preference parameter to the productivity parameter
for the representative agent of type i. The indirect utility function has the
following self-evident properties: Vq < 0, VB > 0, V3 < 0 (the sub indices
denote partial derivatives; in particular, V3 denotes the partial derivative
7It is easy to show that in the standard optimal taxation problem with two private
commodities plus leisure, where the indirect tax structure collapses to the de￿nition of
only one commodity tax rate, the concept of discouragement (encouragement) becomes
the same as ￿being taxed at a positive rate￿ (￿being subsidized￿).
5with respect to the third argument). In order to satisfy the single-crossing
condition (indiﬀerence curves cross only once), we will also assume V33 < 0
(labour is annoying at increasing rates) and VB3 < 0 ( a ni n c r e a s ei np r i v a t e
consumption is valued more, the less ￿experienced hours￿ (αl)t h ep e r s o ni s
working, i.e. normality of private consumption and ￿experienced￿ leisure).
To establish that single crossing holds, we will calculate the slopes of
the indiﬀerence curves in (pre-tax income, disposable income)-space, hence-
forth referred to as (Y ,B)-space, of the three types. The slope of such an
indiﬀerence curve is given by
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It turns out that the slopes of the three types indiﬀerence curves can be
ranked according to the ratio of the preference parameter α to ability w.
Comparing two types i and j, the slope of the indiﬀerence curves of type i







































¢(j).S i n c e , a t e v e r y ( Y ,B)-bundle, the type speci￿cr a t i oα
w
determines the slope of the indiﬀerence curve for each type of agent, the
indiﬀerence curves of two agents of diﬀerent types can cross only once.
2.1 A Comparison with Related Models
Compared with the related models developed by Cuﬀ (2000) and Boadway
et al. (2002), the distinguishing feature of our model is the introduction of
an additional, taxable commodity. Cuﬀ uses a model with three types of
agents and a two goods economy (private consumption plus leisure), where
high skilled agents have low taste for leisure, while there are low skilled
agents with both high and low taste for leisure. In order to make the results
comparable to those of Besley and Coate (1995), she uses individual utility
functions that are aﬃne in consumption.
Boadway et al. (2002) instead use a model with four types of agents
(and the same two goods economy), in which low skilled agents with low
taste for leisure are observationally indiscernible from the new type of high
skilled agents with high taste for leisure. The agents￿ utility functions are
quasi-linear, but in their case aﬃne in labour. More precisely, they assume
6U = u(z) − αil,a n dαL
wL = αH
wH. Thus the ￿intermediate￿ types are in-
distinguishable because they share the same map of indiﬀerence curves in
(Y ,B)-space.
Dealing with a two goods model, the quoted papers are con￿ned to
studying the shape of the optimal income tax schedule and cannot examine
the potential role of commodity taxation. Notice however that, if αL
wL =
αH
wH, then, even in a multi-commodities framework where individual utility
functions are not separable between leisure and other goods, commodity
taxes could not be employed in order to screen between low skilled, low
taste for leisure agents and high skilled, high taste for leisure ones.
Suppose now, as in our model, that we have an economy composed of
three goods (two private consumption goods c and z plus leisure), where
there are three types of individuals: type 1 with high ability and low taste
for leisure, type 2 with high ability and high taste for leisure, and type 3
with high ability and low taste for leisure. Suppose also, as in Boadway
et al. (2002), that type 1 and type 2 are indiscernible because αL
wL = αH
wH,
and that they share the same map of indiﬀerence curves in (Y ,B)-space.
Finally, assume as we proposed in the introduction, that the concern for
horizontal equity translates into the requirement that the total tax liability
of agents of type 2 and type 3 must be the same, and that the social planner
maximizes a utilitarian social welfare function subject to the self-selection
constraints (stating that no agent would gain by masquerading as an agent
of a diﬀerent type) and the budget-balance constraint for the government.
In this situation we can have two cases, depending on whether taxation
is merely redistributive or if the government has an exogenous amount of
expenditure to ￿nance. In the former case the solution involves no taxation
at all and the optimal outcome is the laissez-faire one. This is due to the
fact that, since there is necessarily bunching8 b e t w e e nt y p e1a n dt y p e2 ,
the horizontal equity requirement τ2 = τ3 implies that we must have τ1 =
τ2 = τ3. Everybody must pay the same amount of taxes and, since there
is no public expenditure to ￿nance, no taxation is involved. In the latter
case, suppose that the government has to collect a ￿xed positive amount of
revenue. Following the same reasoning as before, we know that each type of
agents must pay the same amount of taxes. Since income and commodity
taxation are both distortive and cause a deadweight loss, the optimal policy
is a uniform lump sum tax which involves no excess burden.
Boadway et al. (2002) are, as we mentioned above, concerned with the
limit situation where high skilled individuals with a high taste for leisure
8According to Weymark (1986), bunching is said to occur if individuals with diﬀerent




wH ,a g e n t s
of type 1 and of type 2 will not only receive the same allocation in (Y ,B)-space, but they
will also spend their disposable income across goods in exactly the same way, and this is
true even if preferences are not separable between leisure and other goods.
7cannot be distinguished from low skilled individuals with a low taste for












At every point in (Y ,B)-space, the slope of the indiﬀerence curve of a low
skilled, hard working agent is shallower than the one of a high skilled, epi-
curean agent, and for this pair of agents the ordinary ranking of the indif-
f e r e n c ec u r v e sb a s e do nt h e i rs l o p e si sr e v e r s e d . 9
2.2 Some Considerations about the Pattern of the Binding
Self-selection Constraints
In conventional hidden information optimal taxation models, the unobserv-
ability of the agents￿ types raises a familiar problem. The government may
wish to redistribute resources from high skilled to low skilled types (since
laissez faire utility normally increases with the wage rate). Not knowing
who is who, however, all it can do is to tax higher incomes more heavily
than lower incomes. This may create an incentive for a high skilled agent
to reduce his labour supply in order to earn the same gross income as a
low skilled agent. Thus, having imposed the single crossing condition, the
binding self-selection constraint that thwarts the government in its attempts
to redistribute among individuals runs downwards from high skilled (high
earning) agents towards low skilled (low earning) ones. In a ￿nite-class
economy this is generalized by saying that an optimal allocation results in
a simple monotonic chain to the left (Guesnerie and Seade, 1982), which
means that each pair of successive bundles are L-linked10 by a downwards
9If we had instead made the assumption αH
wH < αL
wL, the chain of inequalities would










This case re￿ects more closely the standard one since there is no agent with high ability
that has indiﬀerence curves in (Y ,B)-space that are steeper than the ones of the low skilled
agents. Since the reasoning is not changed fundamentally and the algebra becomes a bit





wL. The complete derivations of the optimal tax mix for this case is
available upon request.
10Using the terminology of Guesnerie and Seade (1982), a corner (or chosen bundle) is
linked to another if they both belong to the optimal set of some agent h; or equivalently
if there is an indiﬀerence curve of h which passes through both corners and is the highest
hc a nr e a c ho nt h eb u d g e ts e t .T h i sa g e n thi ss a i dt ol i n kt h e s ec o r n e r s .Ac o r n e rC i is
8binding incentive-compatibility constraint. However, as long as individuals
diﬀer both according to their market ability and according to their prefer-
ences for leisure, this is no longer necessarily true even if (as in our case)
the single crossing condition still holds. Thus we cannot tell ap r i o r iwhich
one of the pair of self-selection constraints connecting two types is going
to be binding. Under certain circumstances, both constraints could even
be binding at the same time (generating what Brito et al. (1990) call a
￿self-selection cycle￿). Notice that the mentioned properties are a common
feature of all models that introduce heterogeneity along more than one di-
mension (see Balestrino, Cigno and Pettini (1999) and Cremer, Pestieau
and Rochet (2001)). Finally, notice also that although the single crossing
condition holds in our model, it will not generally do so in models with more
than one diﬀerentiating characteristic of the agents.
3T h e O p t i m a l T a x M i x
In this section we solve the model for the optimal tax mix under the assump-
tion about the agents￿ indiﬀerence curves described in the previous section.
Thus we assume αL
wH < αL
wL < αH
wH. Horizontal equity requires that
Y 3 − B3 + tc3 = Y 2 − B2 + tc2 =⇒ Y 3 = t
¡
c2 − c3¢
+ Y 2 − B2 + B3, (5)
i.e. that total taxes paid by an agent of type 2 equal total taxes paid by an


























+ Y 2 − B2 + B3¤¶
, (6)
subject to the budget constraint:
π1 ¡
Y 1 − B1 + tc1¢
+π2 ¡
Y 2 − B2 + tc2¢
+π3 ¡
Y 2 − B2 + tc2¢
≥ G, (γ)


















W-linked (W for winner) if some h links Ci t os o m eo t h e rc o r n e rC j,a n di sa l l o c a t e dC i.
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where we have substituted the horizontal equity constraint into the indirect
utility function of type 3 agents and a ￿hat￿ above the function V i indicates
that the indirect utility is evaluated at a point where type i is mimicking
another type. The sub indices on the Lagrange multipliers indicate the
type of the potential mimicker, and the super indices indicate the direc-
tion of the incentive compatibility constraint: ￿u￿ for upwards and ￿d￿ for
downwards (according to the ranking given by the slopes of the indiﬀerence
curves). Since single crossing holds, we only need to take the self-selection
constraints linking pairs of adjacent individuals into account. In accordance
with standard practice in the optimal taxation literature, we will simply as-
sume that a solution exists and characterize the optimal tax mix conditional
on this assumption.
M o r e o v e r ,t h ew a yw eh a v ec h o s e nt oi n c o r p o r a t et h ec o n s t r a i n t( 5 )
implies that every variation in B2, B3, Y 2 and t must be accompanied by
ap r o p e rv a r i a t i o ni nY 3, the pre-tax income of type 3 agents, in order to
match the horizontal equity requirement. By diﬀerentiating the horizontal
equity constraint (5), and denoting with ci
3 the derivative of the demand of
agents of type i for commodity c with respect to the third argument in the












































10The Commodity Tax Rate
Next we will derive a formula for the commodity tax that maximizes the
planner￿s objective above. The ￿rst order condition of this problem with
respect to the commodity tax rate, t,i s :
π1V 1



























































































































If we consider the ￿normal￿ case when redistribution goes from high- to
low-skilled agents we can invoke Proposition 1 by Brito et al. (1990) to show
that λu
1 = λd
1 =0 . The proposition states that, at any eﬃcient allocation,
a g e n t so fo n et y p ew i l la l w a y sv i e wt h eb u n d l e so fa g e n t so fo t h e rt y p e st h a t
have a larger total tax liability as strictly inferior to their own. By applying
Roy￿s identity, making use of the ￿rst order conditions for B1, B2 and B3












































c1 − b c3
´
, (12)
where e c denotes compensated demand.
Let￿s try to explain the diﬀerence between our formula and the structure
one usually gets when de￿ning the optimal commodity tax rule. In order to
facilitate a comparison, we report the formula that we would have obtained






















c1 − b c3
´
. (13)
In particular, the only diﬀerences between eq. (12) and eq. (13) are found on
the left-hand sides. The structure of the standard formula for optimal com-
modity taxation (in a framework where it supplements a non-linear income
tax schedule) involves a trade-oﬀ between the gains in terms of weakening
the self-selection constraints and the eﬀects on government￿s revenue due to
a marginal increase in one of the commodity tax rates. Moreover, the rev-
enue eﬀects are evaluated only indirectly through the change in the pattern
of hicksian commodity demands since the marginal increase in the tax rate
i sp e r f o r m e di nac o m p e n s a t e dw a y .H a v i n gt h i si nm i n di tb e c o m e se a s yt o
interpret eq. (12). In fact, inside the square brackets, π3 ∂ e c2
∂q replaces π3 ∂ e c3
∂q
since in the budget constraint, the variables referring to agents of type 3 are
replaced by the condition requiring that the total tax liability of all the high
skilled agents is the same. The second term on the left-hand side of eq. (12)
measures the impact of the compensated increase in the commodity tax rate
on the indirect utility of agents of type 3. This impact is socially evaluated,
i.e. weighted by the numerosity of type 3 agents, and the magnitude of the
Lagrange multiplier of the constraint that prevents agents of this type from
mimicking agents of type 1. This impact diﬀers from zero because we have
imposed an additional constraint on the ￿classical￿ optimal tax problem,
and the substitution of this constraint into the social objective function im-
plies adjustments in the gross income (i.e. in labour supplied) of the high
skilled, hard working agents to accommodate every variation in one of the
variables entering the indirect utility function of high skilled, high taste for
leisure agents.
However, this ￿intuitive￿ explanation needs to be proved formally and
this is what we are going to do next. For this purpose, consider the eﬀects
of a small increase dq in the tax rate on commodity c accompanied by
reductions dTi = −cidq < 0, i =1 ,2,3, in the income tax liabilities of the
three types of agents at their original earnings. This reform has no eﬀect on
the welfare of either type one or two since by use of Roy￿s identity:
dV i = V i
qdq+V i





dq =0 ,i =1 ,2.
(14)
Now look at the impact of this ￿compensated￿ reform on the welfare of the
agents belonging to type three: this is measured by
12dV 3 = V 3
q dq + V 3
















































Substituting dB2 = c2dq and dB3 = c3dq into the previous expression and
making use of Roy￿s identity, one gets


























which by use of the Slutsky equation can be written

















We can refer to (17) as to the non-sterilized (due to the necessity to match
the horizontal equity constraint) eﬀect on utility of a compensated (in the
standard meaning of the term) increase in the commodity tax rate. Eq. (12)































where df V 3 is equal to the quantity dV 3
dq in eq. (17) and the ￿tilde￿ helps to
remember that this eﬀect is produced by a ￿compensated￿ marginal varia-
tion in the commodity tax rate.
In order to clarify the mechanisms of our model, it is instructive to
check the sign of df V 3. It is easy to recognize that, since V 3
3 is negative,
the ￿compensated￿ eﬀect of the conjectured reform on the indirect utility of
agents of type 3 is positive if and only if
³
∂ e c2








< 0; in turn,
this requirement means that one of the four following conditions holds:
i) t>0,
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
∂e c2
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(where |￿| denotes absolute values).
Regarding the conditions that make df V 3 < 0,w eo n l yg i v et h eo n ew h i c h
will turn out to be useful later on:
i0) t<0,
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
∂ e c2
∂q
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
>
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
∂ e c3
∂q









wH is bigger than zero, and denote situations starting from
which a marginal increase in the commodity tax rate (or reduction in the
commodity subsidy rate) raises the total tax liability of an agent of type 3
(high skilled, low taste for leisure) more than the one of an agent of type
2 (high skilled, high taste for leisure). This in turn means that there is a
need to reduce the total tax liability of the former agent and this objective
is (as intuition would suggest) achieved by means of a (utility enhancing)
reduction in his income tax liability (i.e. gross income Y 3).
Conditions ii) and iv) instead characterize situations where a marginal
increase in the commodity tax rate (or reduction in the commodity subsidy
rate) weighs upon agents of type 3 less than it does upon agents of type
2 since relatively more revenue is extracted from the latter type of agents.
This in turn means that in order to match the horizontal equity constraint
it is necessary to raise the total tax liability of the former type of agents.
However, in this case the goal is achieved, counterintuitively, via ar e d u c t i o n
in the gross income Y 3. Since in this case 1+tc3
3
αL
wH < 0,t h en e te ﬀect of
a marginal increase Y 3on the government￿s revenue is negative even if the
marginal unit of income is taxed at a 100 percent rate. This is due to the
recomposing of demand across consumption goods which greatly reduces
indirect tax receipts. To raise the total tax payment of agents of type 3, one
has to lower their gross income and rely on the positive net eﬀect working
through the change in the consumption pattern.
However, conditions ii) and iv) are mainly a curiosity, and can never hold
at an interior optimum; actually, it can be proved that they turn out to be
con￿icting with one of the ￿rst order conditions of the planner￿s problem.
To show this, take the derivative of the budget constraint of an agent of
type 3 (qc3 + z3 = B3) with respect to disposable income, B:
14qc3
B + z3




If commodities c and z are normal, from (19) we have 1 − tc3
B > 0.A











> 0 (since V 3
B > 0 and V 3
3 < 0)b u t ,i f1 − tc3
B > 0,t h e n




We should also notice a particular consequence of the assumption αL
wL <
αH
wH. Under this assumption agents of type 2 have the steepest indiﬀerence
curves in (Y ,B)-space even though they actually are high skilled and receive
a high wage per hour, because their preferences involve a high taste for
leisure. This in turn entails that the two terms on the right-hand side
of eq. (12) must have opposite signs (or both be equal to zero) although
the two mimickers are both high skilled agents and, to mimic the bundle
intended for agents of type 1, they provide the same quantity of eﬀective
labour, smaller than that provided by the mimicked agents. In fact, notice
that demand for commodity c c a nb ee x p r e s s e da sc = c(q,B,αl);t a k i n g
the derivative with respect to labour, we have that the consumption of the
taxed commodity is positively related to labour (leisure) if αc3 > (<)0
(which means if c3 > (<)0). As mimickers, both agents of type 2 and
agents of type 3 will earn the same pre-tax income Y 1 as agents of type one;
therefore the following chain of inequalities holds:
αH






αHb l>αLl1 > αLb l,
where b l = b l2 = b l3 d e n o t et h ec o m m o n( s i n c ea g e n t so ft y p e2a n da g e n t so f
type 3 are both high skilled agents and are paid the same wage rate wH)
level of labour supplied by agents of type 2 and agents of type 3 in order to
mimic agents of type 1. Under assumption 1, c3 6=0is therefore a suﬃcient
condition to ensure that a true low skilled agent￿s consumption of the taxed
good is in between the consumption of this good chosen by a high skilled,
hard working mimicker and a high skilled, epicurean mimicker, which means
that sign
³




c1 − b c3
´
.
Having interpreted eq. (12), the rule for the optimal commodity tax,
and also having clari￿ed some of the details of this rule, we are ready to
state its novel properties in a proposition. Following the proposition, we
will discuss the intuition behind some of the most interesting cases.
Proposition 1 At the constrained utilitarian optimum (with redistribution
from high to low skilled agents) under the assumption αL
wL < αH
wH in our two
15goods model, it is not always true that:
(a) a commodity that is complementary to leisure should be discouraged
whereas a commodity that is complementary to labour should be encouraged;
(b) a commodity that is normally expected to be encouraged should be subsi-
dized whereas a commodity that is normally expected to be discouraged should
be taxed at a positive rate.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Proposition 1 clearly diﬀers from the popular prescription in the litera-
ture on optimal taxation telling that goods complementary to labour should
be encouraged while goods complementary to leisure11 should be discouraged
by the commodity tax system (whereas ￿encouraged￿ and ￿discouraged￿ are
both intended in the Mirrleesian sense12). In the standard13 counterpart of
eq. (13) with many types of agents and many commodities, this is re￿ected
in that the expression on the right-hand side, which provides a social eval-
uation of the gains in terms of relaxing the binding incentive compatibility
constraints arising from a marginal (compensated) increase in one of the
commodity tax rates, is positive (negative) if the commodity which price is
marginally increased by the tax is complementary to labour (leisure).
We have already observed that, when people diﬀer along more than one
dimension, we cannot invoke Proposition 6 by Guesnerie and Seade (1982),
and say that the budget set will be a simple monotonic chain to the left.
In our model, the horizontal equity constraint together with the assumption
of redistribution from high- towards low skilled agents (what we referred
to as the ￿normal￿ case) imply that the direction of mimicking ￿converges
to the centre￿, which, using Guesnerie and Seade terminology, means that
the corner intended for the low skilled agents is L-linked (see footnote 10)
to both of the corners intended for the two diﬀerent types of high skilled
agents. This remark explains why it is not necessarily expected that a
commodity complementary to labour should be encouraged or a commodity
complementary to leisure should be discouraged by the indirect tax system.
The feature just mentioned is shared by all models where the Pareto-
eﬃcient tax structure doesn￿t entail a simple monotonic chain to the left,
11Complementary to labour (leisure) is here used as a short for and corresponds to the
de￿nition by Pollak (1969) of negatively related to leisure (labour).
12In a general context where there are n commodities and m agents, the index of discour-
















where q and t denote respectively consumer prices and commodity tax rates, x
h
i is the
demand for commodity i by agent h and a tilde denotes hicksian demand. The index is
an approximate measure of the change in compensated demand due to the tax system;
positive values of the index mean that the commodity is encouraged by the indirect tax
system, while negative values correspond to discouragement.
13Standard is here meant to describe a situation where individuals diﬀer only with
regard to their skill level and wages are exogenous.
16but in our model a second peculiarity stands out which is strictly related to
the introduction of the horizontal equity constraint. In particular, whereas
in the standard model with two private consumption goods, the term by
which the commodity tax rate t is multiplied is always negative (because of
the concavity of the expenditure function), here it is not possible to rule out
the circumstance that, due to the presence of an additional factor (df V 3),
the aforesaid term turns out to be positive, in which case we should have the
￿anomalous￿ prescriptions that a commodity to be encouraged, according
to the sign of the right-hand side of eq. (12), should in fact be taxed at a
positive rate, whereas a commodity to be discouraged, always according to
the sign of the right-hand side of eq. (12), should actually be subsidized.
Thus, a commodity that is complementary to labour and that also should
be encouraged according to the right-hand side of eq. (12) can nonetheless
be taxed at a positive rate. Starting with a positive value of the commodity
tax rate, we have that even if a decrease in the excise would be bene￿cial
in terms of (compensated) revenue and weakening of the self-selection con-
straints, this policy measure is not implemented because the bene￿ts are
more than oﬀset by the high cost in terms of reduction of the indirect utility
of agents of type 3 descending from the demand to keep the horizontal equity
constraint satis￿ed, which would require an increase in the gross income Y 3
(cf. condition i)). Similarly, a commodity that is complementary to leisure
and that also should be discouraged according to the right-hand side of eq.
(12) can nevertheless be subsidized. Starting with a negative value of the
commodity tax rate, even if an increase in the excise would be bene￿cial
in terms of (compensated) revenue and weakening of the self-selection con-
straints, this policy measure does not take place because of the damaging
eﬀect on the indirect utility of agents of type three coming from the increase
in the gross income Y 3 needed to maintain the horizontal equity constraint
satis￿ed (cf. condition i0).
The Marginal Eﬀective Tax Rates
We turn now to the problem of the evaluation of the marginal eﬀective
tax rate (METR) faced by the agents at the optimal allocation. We will
derive an expression for the METR, characterize the METR in a proposition,
and brie￿y discuss the (rather standard) results at the end.
Since in this model there are only two commodities and one of them is
chosen as numØraire and set untaxed, the eﬀective tax rate is de￿ned as
τ(Y )=T(Y )+tc
h






where T (Y )=Y −B represents the income tax liability. By diﬀerentiation
of (20) we get the marginal eﬀective tax rate











As usual we can derive an expression for the marginal income tax rate
faced by an agent by considering his optimal choice of labour supply. The
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Substituting (22) into (21) allow us to rewrite the expression for the















With this expression at hand, we can characterize the marginal eﬀective tax
rate in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Under the assumption αL
wL < αH
wH, the constrained utilitarian
optimum with redistribution from high- to low skilled agents is characterized
by:
(a) a marginal eﬀective tax rate faced by type 1 (low skilled, low taste for
leisure) that is either positive or negative;
(b) a zero marginal eﬀective tax rate faced by type 2 (high skilled, high taste
for leisure) and type 3 (high skilled, low taste for leisure).
Proof. See Appendix C.
As anticipated, the results that we have obtained are rather standard.
Since there is nobody longing for mimicking either one of the two types of
high skilled agents (i.e. the corners intended for them are not L-linked to
any other corner), the distortions brought about by income and commodity
taxation will ￿average out￿ to zero so that they are ￿globally￿ undistorted
at the margin, even though they are both aﬀected by the horizontal equity
constraint. Since, due to the assumption αL
wL < αH
wH, in this three-types
economy, the high skilled, high taste for leisure agents will earn the lowest
gross income while the high skilled, low taste for leisure agents will earn the
highest one, the result parallels the ￿end-point￿ results on the desirability
of zero marginal taxation at the top (so long as wages in the population
are bounded above), and at the bottom (so long as everyone supplies some
labour at the optimum, i.e. there is no bunching at zero hours, see Tuomala
(1990)) of the skills distribution achieved in optimal tax literature dealing
with a continuum of types.
18N o t eh o w e v e rt h a ti fw eh a di n s t e a dm a d et h ea s s u m p t i o n αH
wH < αL
wL,
the METR faced by any of the types of high-skilled agents could diﬀer from
zero. The derivations in this slightly more complicated case are available
upon request. It turns out that the METR of either type 2 or type 3 is zero,
whereas the METR of the other type can be either positive or negative.
Regarding the low skilled agents, the METR could be of either sign. This
is also not surprising since their corner is L-linked both to the one intended
for the high skilled, high taste for leisure agents (by a binding upwards in-
centive compatibility constraint) and to the one intended for the high skilled,
low taste for leisure ones (by a binding downwards incentive compatibility
constraint); and while a binding upwards self-selection constraint calls for
a negative METR in order to weaken the constraint, a binding downwards
self-selection constraint calls for a positive METR to achieve the same goal.
4C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
In this paper, we have not tried to make an ethical case for the horizontal
equity principle. Indeed as argued by Kaplow (1995), although horizontal
equity is intuitively appealing, there is need for studies that try both to
justify this principle, and to derive a precise measure of equity from the jus-
ti￿cation. Our intentions have rather been to investigate how the preferred
t a xm i xm i g h tc h a n g ei fw ew e r et ot a k eh o r i z o n t a le q u i t ys e r i o u s l y .
The investigation has made clear that the horizontal equity principle in
combination with heterogeneity of preferences for leisure may seriously aﬀect
the incentives for income and commodity taxation. The basic intuition and
policy implications from models with heterogeneity in ability only may not
carry over into models where heterogeneity is two-dimensional. Contrary
to normal ￿ndings, our results indicate that a good that is complementary
to leisure need not be discouraged by the tax system, and a good that is
normally expected to be discouraged by the tax system need not be taxed at
a positive rate even if the economy is composed by only two private goods
and leisure. As expected, the direction of redistribution is a crucial factor
for the marginal eﬀective tax rates, but the introduction of the horizontal
equity restriction complicates matters here as well. It is for instance possible
to have a marginal tax instead of a subsidy ￿on average￿ for the high ability,
hard working-type even though the self-selection constraint relating them to
the high ability, epicurean-type is binding upwards.
Before concluding, we note a possible objection against our assumptions
discussed by Cuﬀ (2000). In a model where the individuals are held respon-
sible for their preferences, a higher taste for leisure can be interpreted as
laziness. Another alternative is to interpret these preferences as some kind
of disability. Whereas it is intuitive to argue that compensation for laziness
should be ruled out, it is￿at least in the framework of responsibility and
19compensation￿less obvious that people that are for some other reason un-
able to work as hard as others, should not receive any compensation for this
disability. Besides the bene￿ts associated with a focus on one of the polar
cases, our ￿ndings are also relevant as long as the taste for leisure among
some individuals is to some extent interpreted more as laziness than as a
disability.
To conclude, although our model is very simple and stylized, we hope
that we have managed to call attention to the relevance and the potential
consequences of a horizontal equity restriction for tax policy. Without doubt
there are great prospects for more research in this relatively unexplored area
of tax theory.
20Appendix A: Derivation of eq. (12)













































































































































































1 =0(Proposition 1 in Brito et al. (1990)), and
applying Roy￿s identity, eq. (11), the ￿rst order condition for t, becomes:
−π1c1V 1
B − π2c2V 2






2 b c2c V 2
B + λd
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B + λd









































By using the Slutsky equation and by some further manipulation, one
￿nally gets eq. (12).
22Appendix B: Proof of Proposition 1
From eq. (12), it follows that four main cases of commodity taxation
can come true and each of them can be recognized as made up by an ￿or-














c1 − b c3
´
> 0,t > 0, γπ1 ∂ e c1
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> 0,t < 0, γπ1 ∂ e c1
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< 0,t > 0, γπ1 ∂ e c1






















c1 − b c3
´
< 0,t < 0, γπ1 ∂ e c1








¢ df V 3
t > 0
Note that both the ￿rst and the third case encompass a ￿non-ordinary￿
sub-case with a commodity complementary to labour but taxed at a pos-
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c1 − b c3
´
< 0), besides the standard case of a commodity comple-
mentary to leisure and taxed at a positive rate (respectively c1 − b c2 > 0,












c1 − b c3
´
> 0,a n dc1 − b c2 > 0,












c1 − b c3
´
< 0).
T h es e c o n da n dt h ef o u r t hc a s eo nt h eo t h e rh a n db o t he n c o m p a s s
a ￿non-ordinary￿ sub-case of a commodity complementary to leisure but
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c1 − b c3
´
< 0), besides a standard one of a com-
modity complementary to labour and subsidized (respectively c1 − b c2 < 0,












c1 − b c3
´
> 0,a n dc1 − b c2 < 0,












c1 − b c3
´
< 0).
For (a), note that the mentioned ￿non-ordinary￿ sub-cases in case 2
and case 3 diﬀer from the standard policy prescription because the sign of
the right-hand side of eq. (12) is not determined by the relation of the
taxed commodity with labor/leisure. Thus, it is possible that a good that
is normally expected to be discouraged (encouraged) in order to loosen the
self-selection constraints, should actually be encouraged (discouraged) in a
model where the agents diﬀer along more than one dimension.
23For (b), note that the only ￿non-ordinary￿ sub-cases that can be re-
garded as truly ￿anomalous￿ are those belonging to the ￿rst and fourth
rows of the table, since they are respectively concerned with a commod-
ity complementary to labour, the consumption of which, according to the
sign of the right-hand side of eq. (12), should be encouraged, and with a
commodity complementary to leisure, the consumption of which, always ac-
cording to the sign of the right-hand side of eq. (12), should be discouraged.
If we consider in more detail those two truly ￿anomalous￿ sub-cases, we ￿nd
that they share the feature of being characterized by a high and positive
value of the ratio df V 3
t , high enough to be able to outweigh the absolute
value of γπ1 ∂ e c1




πi, and reverse the sign of the term by which t is
multiplied in the left-hand side of eq. (12). However, whilst in the former
sub-case this means a high and positive value of df V 3 (since we are looking
for conditions that are compatible with t>0), in the latter sub-case this
requirement means a high and negative value of the aforesaid term (since we
are looking for conditions that are compatible with a subsidy). Apart from
this diﬀerence, from eq. (17) we get that
¯ ¯ ¯∂ e c2
∂q
¯ ¯ ¯ >
¯ ¯ ¯∂ e c3
∂q
¯ ¯ ¯ must be satis￿ed in
both of those sub-cases.
¥
24Appendix C: Proof of Proposition 2
Considering the ￿normal￿ case when redistribution is directed towards
the low skilled agents and λu
2 = λd
1 =0 ,t h e￿rst order conditions of the
planner￿s problem with respect to the gross incomes Y 1 and Y 2 are as fol-
lows:















































dY 2 =0 .
(C2)































































































































where Ω = wL
wH. Introducing the notation w1 = wL
αL, w2 = wH
αH ,a n dw3 = wH
αL ,







































where Ω1,2 = w1










> 0 since agents of type
1h a v ei n d i ﬀerence curves in (Y ,B)-space that are at every point steeper than











because, under assumption 1, agents of type 2 have indiﬀerence curves in
the same space that are at every point steeper than the ones of agents of










γπ1 are all positive,
t h es i g no ft h eM E T Rf a c e db yt y p e1i sa m b i g u o u s .


































































































2 =0 , (C8)
where in the last passage we made use of (23).
For type 3, we use eq. (A7) stating that
−V 3



















































wH =0= ⇒ τ0
3 =0 , (C10)
where in the last passage we again made use of (23).
¥
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